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This paper studies the e⁄ect of product ownership and quality on nonstop entry in the airline industry.
Speci￿cally, this paper empirically examines the decision of an airline to o⁄er high quality nonstop service between
cities given that the airline may or may not be o⁄ering lower quality one-stop service. I ￿nd that airlines that
o⁄er one-stop service through a hub are less likely to enter that same market with nonstop service than those that
do not. In addition, the quality of the one-stop service is an important determinant of entry. Airlines are more
likely to enter a market with nonstop service if their own or their rival￿ s one-stop service in the market are of lower
quality. Estimates suggest that the entry of a rival nonstop carrier diminishes the probability a carrier enters the
market with nonstop service. However, airlines o⁄ering one-stop service respond di⁄erently to nonstop rivals. In
particular, relative to other carriers, those o⁄ering one-stop service are more likely to enter markets if there are
nonstop rivals, suggesting that cannibalization e⁄ects are diminished in the presence of nonstop competition.1 Introduction
From breakfast cereals to computers to airline ￿ ights there are many di⁄erentiated product industries in which
￿rms o⁄er multiple products in the same market. However, there are relatively few empirical papers that examine
the entry decision of multiproduct ￿rms. This paper studies the e⁄ect of product ownership and quality on the
decision to enter a market in the airline industry. The market considered in this paper is transportation services
between two cities. I consider two types of services in the city pair market: nonstop service and one-stop service
that stops in a hub before reaching the destination city. This paper empirically examines the decision of an airline
to o⁄er high quality nonstop service between cities given that the airline may be o⁄ering lower quality one-stop
service in that market.
In this paper I consider nonstop and one-stop ￿ ights to be vertically di⁄erentiated services. The nonstop
service is a higher quality than the one-stop service in terms of travel time. Several demand studies show that
consumers prefer more direct ￿ ights.
2 One-stop services also vary in quality. I proxy for the relative quality of
the one-stop service using a measure of the directness of the one-stop ￿ ight.





Figure 1: Hub Competition
2For example, the demand study by Berry et al (1997) ￿nds that passengers prefer direct ￿ights relative to indirect ￿ights. Direct
￿ight includes all nonstop ￿ights and ￿ights in which there is a stop but passengers do not change planes. An indirect ￿ight is a ￿ight in
which a passenger changes planes. Borenstein (1989) ￿nds that each on-plane stop implies a discount of 3 percent to 13 percent in price
and 3 to 8 percent discount for each plane change made.Suppose we have just two airlines, X and Y . Suppose that airline X is a hub carrier that has a hub at A
and o⁄ers one-stop service in the B to C market through the hub. Airline Y does not have a hub and does not
have any existing service in the market. The entry game considered in this paper is the decision of airline X and
airline Y to enter the B to C market with nonstop service. I view the one-stop service as a⁄ecting nonstop entry
through both cannibalization and business stealing e⁄ects. The business stealing e⁄ect is the e⁄ect that competing
rival one-stop service has on the pro￿ts of the entering nonstop service. On the other hand, for airlines that own
one-stop services, o⁄ering nonstop service cannibalizes demand for their existing one-stop service. Relative to
airlines that have no services in the market, airlines that o⁄er one-stop service have lower incremental pro￿ts from
o⁄ering nonstop service. In the above example, airline Y considers the business stealing e⁄ect from competing
with the one-stop service in the market. Airline X considers cannibalization of its own one-stop service that acts
as a disincentive for entering the market. One might expect that both cannibalization and business stealing e⁄ects
increase as the quality of the one-stop service in the market increases. The model in this paper also considers
competition between nonstop services. One might expect pro￿ts to decrease when rival airlines enter the market
with competing nonstop services. Finally, if airlineY enters the market, this may reduce pro￿ts on airline X￿ s
one-stop service. If the pro￿tability of the one-stop service is reduced then this also reduces the cannibalization
e⁄ect for airline X, which may increase the likelihood that it enters with nonstop service.
This paper models nonstop entry of airlines as a noncooperative entry game, which allows for an economic
interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients. The basic empirical approach of this paper is similar to Berry (1992)
and uses a simulation estimator to recover the reduced-form incremental pro￿t from o⁄ering nonstop service. The
model di⁄ers from previous work in airline entry in two important ways. First, I focus on the nonstop entry
decision while most other research aggregates across one-stop and nonstop entry. This may be important since
Reiss and Spiller (1989) ￿nd that the type of services in airline markets (i.e. number of ￿rms o⁄ering direct ￿ ights
or indirect ￿ ights) is an important determinant of the level of competition in the market, not just the number of
airlines in the market. They argue that aggregating across service segments may lead to incorrect inference about
the pro￿tability from entering a market. A second important di⁄erence from previous empirical work is that I
allow the ownership of one-stop service through a hub to a⁄ect the incremental pro￿tability of nonstop entry.
Examining the multiproduct entry decision in airline markets became more relevant as many major network
carriers began operating low-cost divisions in the 1990s.
3 The low-cost divisions of major carriers operating during
the period of my sample include Metrojet (US Airways), Delta Express, Continental Express and United Shuttle.
The low-cost divisions were started in an attempt by major carriers to cut costs and compete with Southwest
and other low-cost carriers. This strategy has been called the "airline-wihin-an-airline" strategy because the
operations of the low-cost divisions di⁄er from those of the rest of the airline. The low-cost divisions cut back on
passenger amenities and shifted emphasis from hub-and-spoke to point-to-point route strategies. In many cases
this involved carriers expanding nonstop service to markets outside of their hubs. It is often the case that major
3The major network carriers in my sample are American Airlines, Continental, Delta, United Airlines, US Airways, Northwest Airlines
and TWA. I refer to these carriers as major "network" carriers to di⁄erentiate them from Southwest which is one of the larger carriers,
but operates more like a low-cost carrier.
2network carriers o⁄er nonstop service in markets in which it also operates one-stop service through a hub. Some
examples of new entry of this type in 2000 include: the Boston to Myrtle Beach market where Delta o⁄ered both
a nonstop ￿ ight and a one-stop ￿ ight through Atlanta; the Las Vegas to Tulsa market where Delta o⁄ered both
nonstop service and one-stop service through Salt Lake City; and the Boston to Raleigh market where US Airways
o⁄ered a nonstop ￿ ight and a one-stop ￿ ight through Charlotte.
The issues raised in some informal complaints presented to the Department of Transportation (DOT) suggest
that this paper may be of interest to policy makers.
4 Several low-cost carriers presented complaints to the DOT
because major network carriers began o⁄ering competing nonstop service in markets that are also served with
one-stop service through a hub. A primary reason for these complaints was that it is relatively unusual for major
network carriers to enter these types of markets. In 1995 ValuJet complained when US Airways began o⁄ering
competing nonstop service from Dulles to Boston and Dulles to Hartford. ValuJet argued that US Airways, in the
prior 10 years, had not operated any service through Dulles that was not a major hub and that entry by US Air
was anticompetitive. In 1996 Air South complained that Continental had attempted to overlay its new service in
three markets: Charleston-Newark, Columbia-Newark, and Myrtle Beach-Newark. The DOT suggests that these
types of strategic entry decisions are di¢ cult to explain as nonpredatory. This paper provides some insight into
the types of markets that an airline may choose to o⁄er both one-stop and nonstop ￿ ights and why both these
services may be o⁄ered.
As theory would suggest I ￿nd evidence that both cannibalization and business stealing are important in
shaping nonstop entry of airlines. I also ￿nd that the quality of the one-stop services in the market determines
the size of the cannibalization and business stealing e⁄ects. The amount of competition in a market increases
with the number of nonstop rivals. However, a nonstop rival may have a second e⁄ect on ￿rms that have an
existing one-stop product in the market because nonstop entry reduces pro￿ts on the existing one-stop ￿ ights,
which, in turn, reduces the cannibalization e⁄ect. This suggests that nonstop rivals may have less of an impact
on carriers with an existing one-stop service in the market relative to carriers without one-stop service. These
￿ndings suggest that in certain circumstances nonstop entry decisions by hub carriers that might appear to be
predatory, may in fact be consistent with competitors attempting to match the quality of rivals.
5
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses some of the related literature in airline entry,
Section 3 examines the development and structure of airline networks, Section 4 explains the data and variables
used in the analysis, Section 5 describes the econometric model, Section 6 discusses the estimates and predictions
of the model, and the ￿nal section concludes.
4The complaints to the DOT were discussed in chapter 2 of a report entitled Entry and Competition in the U.S. Airline Industry:
Issues and Opportunities (1999) (http://books.nap.edu/html/airline_dereg/pdf/)
5This result is consitent with Mazzeo (2003) that shows that additional competition on a route typically leads to improved quality of
service as measured by on-time performance.
32 Literature Review
There are many studies that look at entry in the airline industry, but few of them incorporate a structural model
of competition. Since many studies have found that competition is an important determinant of entry in airline
markets, a structural model of entry should do a better job of predicting the behavior of airlines than a more
naive model. In this section I review some structural airline entry papers including Reiss and Spiller (1989), Berry
(1992), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2004).
6
Reiss and Spiller (1989) model the competition between di⁄erentiated direct and indirect services. Note that
direct service includes all nonstop ￿ ights and also includes all ￿ ights in which there is no change of planes. Indirect
service means a passenger changes planes. They incorporate both entry and price competition in a structural
model and examine how direct entry a⁄ects price competition in the indirect and direct service market. They ￿nd
that the indirect service category is signi￿cantly more competitive if a direct competitor is also in the market.
They also ￿nd that within a route there can be large di⁄erences in direct and indirect competition. This last
point suggests that di⁄erent service types should not be aggregated, adding support to the approach taken in this
paper. There are two key di⁄erences between Reiss and Spiller￿ s work and this paper. First, the Reiss and Spiller
paper only examines markets with one or fewer direct entrants, while my paper considers markets in which there
may be several airlines o⁄ering nonstop ￿ ights. Second, Reiss and Spiller (1989) assume carriers do not own both
a direct and indirect ￿ ight in the same market, while this paper is explicitly interested in service ownership.
Berry (1992) examines the role of market presence in both endpoint airports and its e⁄ect on entry. He
aggregates across service types when de￿ning entry, and allows for multiple entrants. He assumes that entry
a⁄ects the pro￿tability of all airlines symmetrically. This assumption implies that whether Southwest or American
Airlines enters a market they have the same e⁄ect on the pro￿tability of other airlines in the market such as Delta
or Continental. However, Berry￿ s model allows airlines to have both observed and unobserved heterogeneity
in ￿xed costs. He ￿nds that the heterogeneity in airline presence at both endpoint airports is an important
determinant of entry. Berry also ￿nds that his structural model of airline competition produces more realistic
predictions of airline entry behavior than more simple entry models.
Cilberto and Tamer (2006) relax the assumption that entry a⁄ects the pro￿tability of competing airlines
symmetrically. Allowing asymmetric competitive e⁄ects between airlines makes the model su¢ ciently ￿ exible to
allow for Southwest to compete di⁄erently with American than with Delta. In fact, their model allows for a very
general pro￿t function speci￿cation so that di⁄erent carriers may have entirely di⁄erent pro￿t functions. They
￿nd that there is signi￿cant heterogeneity in competition between airlines.
Although Ciliberto and Tamer capture an important aspect of airline heterogeneity, similar to Berry they also
aggregate across nonstop and one-stop service types. Because they aggregate across service types it is di¢ cult
6Another important structural model of airline entry is by Armantier and Richard (2003). They focus on the duopoly competition
between American Airlines and United Airlines at the Chicago hub. Armantier and Richard examine both the entry and quantity choices
of these airlines under the assumption of incomplete information, while my paper and the papers reviewed here assume that airlines play
a complete information entry game.
4to determine whether the asymmetry in competition in their model arises because of the di⁄erent service types
being o⁄ered by di⁄erent airlines (i.e. nonstop or one-stop), or if airlines actually price compete di⁄erently with
each other. One might expect that large network carriers like Delta and American that enter many markets with
one-stop service have less of an impact on the pro￿ts of carriers like Southwest that enter many markets with
nonstop service. In fact, this is what their results tend to suggest. They ￿nd that American and Delta have limited
e⁄ects on the pro￿ts of other carriers relative to Southwest. While several papers have shown that Southwest
has large competitive e⁄ects on rival carriers, the Ciliberto and Tamer model is unable to decompose the impact
on competitor pro￿tability due to Southwest rivalry and the type of service chosen by Southwest.
7 In my paper,
I assume that there is symmetry in nonstop competition, but allow for asymmetry in competition between the
types of services o⁄ered. That is, in this paper the de￿ning characteristic of a carrier on a route is its network,
not the brand of the carrier.
The current entry paper is also related to the entry model of Mazzeo (2002). Mazzeo examines a game of
product di⁄erentiation and entry in motel markets. His model extends previous entry models by endogenizing
product-type decisions (e.g. low-quality motel or high-quality motel). He then measures the e⁄ects of competition
between the di⁄erent product types. My paper also allows for di⁄erent product-types to a⁄ect nonstop entry.
However, I treat one product type as ￿xed, the one-stop service, and I examine the entry decision of o⁄ering
nonstop service. One advantage of treating one-stop service as ￿xed is that I can examine continuous measures of
product quality in the one-stop service a⁄ecting nonstop entry, while Mazzeo￿ s model captures discrete di⁄erences
in product quality. Justi￿cation for treating one-stop service through a hub as ￿xed is given in the next section
of the paper.
3 Hub-and-spoke System and Airline Networks
Before discussing the econometric model, it is important to have some understanding of the structure of airline
networks. After deregulation of airlines in 1978, airlines quickly shifted to a hub-and-spoke system which remains
the predominant structure in the industry today.
8 A hub-and-spoke system brings passengers from "spoke" cities
into a "hub" city where passengers transfer planes and ￿ y to destination "spoke" cities. There are both e¢ ciency
and strategic advantages for operating hub-and-spoke networks.
The e¢ ciency of the hub-and-spoke system has been thoroughly studied both empirically and theoretically.
The hub-and-spoke system creates high density along spoke routes, which leads to lower costs per passenger. By
channelling passengers into a hub, the network is able to generate greater density along all the spokes of the hub.
Therefore, hubs allow for more e¢ cient use of facilities and aircraft. Empirical studies by Caves et al (1984) and
later Brueckner and Spiller (1994) estimate signi￿cant cost savings from economies of density, which suggest that
this is a key factor motivating the restructuring of the industry following deregulation. Brueckner et al (1992)
examine the structure of the hub network directly and show that there is a relationship between higher tra¢ c
7Both Morrison (2001) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2004) show the impact of Southwest entry on fares set by rival airlines.
8See Graham Kaplan and Sibley (1983) for a description of key changes after regulation.
5density across the network and lower fares. Hendricks et al (1995) provide a formal theoretical model to explain
economies of spoke density, and how hub-and-spoke networks arise from basic assumptions about cost savings
from economies of density.
Other reasons airlines form hub-and-spoke networks involve strategic advantages. Hendricks et al (1997)
explain why it is generally a dominant strategy for hub airlines not to exit a hub-spoke market. They argue that
the hub-spoke market produces complementarities in ￿ ights that connect in the hub. A monopoly hub that faces
competition from a regional carrier along a spoke can credibly remain in the market under price competition
because exiting a spoke causes losses in its complementary markets. This credible threat keeps potential entrants
out of spoke markets. A hub carrier o⁄ering frequent ￿ yer miles also has a strategic advantage. Passengers that
use frequent ￿ yer miles value the hub carrier￿ s frequent ￿ yer miles more than other carriers because the hub serves
a greater variety of destinations.
9 Hence, passengers that use frequent ￿ yer plans may be more likely to choose
the hub carrier. In the remainder of this paper I refer to the combined e¢ ciency and strategic e⁄ects of airline
networks as network e⁄ects.
If the network e⁄ects are su¢ ciently large, then after a hub-and-spoke network is formed, hub carriers will
not ￿nd it pro￿table exit spoke routes. Therefore, nonstop routes out of a hub are essentially ￿xed. A ￿xed
hub network implies that one-stop routes made through the hub are also ￿xed because passengers can typically
connect in a hub. An example using the ￿gure 1 from the introduction helps to illustrate this point. Suppose
there are 17 cities and 16 spoke routes connected directly through hub city A. Assume that all connecting ￿ ights
through A are o⁄ered. Now consider the marginal decision to o⁄er nonstop service between two spoke cities B
and C as shown by a dotted line in the above ￿gure. The decision to serve the market between B and C with
nonstop service is exogenous to the decision to serve the market B to C through the hub if the entry decision
in the A to C and A to B markets is una⁄ected. Because A is a hub exiting a spoke market A to C or A to B
implies exiting 15 connecting markets. The same factors that make it unlikely for a carrier to exit a spoke route
of a hub also have implications for hub carriers entering spoke routes. The entry decision of a hub carrier will be
less a⁄ected by competitive factors on a particular route and will primarily be determined as a joint decision to
serve the spoke market and many other markets through its hub.
To see that large hub-spoke networks are relatively ￿xed, I examine the entry and exit rates between all city
pairs in a sample of the 50 largest cities. Table 1 in the appendix shows the number of nonstop entry and exits
from the second quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 2000. I ￿nd that entry and exit rates are much lower for
hub carriers in their hub-and-spoke markets relative to entry and exit rates in markets where no carrier operates
a hub.
10 From 1996 to 2000 the hub carriers at their hub had an exit rate of 1.33 percent in their spoke markets,
compared to an exit rate of 19.45 percent in nonhub markets in which no carrier operates a hub. The entry rate
in hub markets is also much lower for hub carriers at their hub relative to entry rates in non-hub markets. The
entry and exit rates provide strong evidence in support of treating hub markets as ￿xed.
9See Borenstein (1989) for a discussion of frequent ￿yer marketing strategy and empirical work supporting this strategy.
10Exit (Entry) rates are computed as the fraction of carriers observed Entering (Exiting) from 1996 to 2000 out of the total number of
nonstop ￿ights o⁄ered in 1996.
64 Data
The primary data source used are the second quarter data from 2000 of the O¢ cial Airline Guide (OAG). The
OAG data are a weekly schedule of all nonstop ￿ ights operated by domestic and international carriers. Each
observation in the database represents a particular ￿ ight by a carrier in a quarter and includes information on the
identities of the carrier, the origin and destination airports and the days of the week in which the ￿ ight operates.
The OAG data are used to determine which carriers o⁄er nonstop service.
A secondary source is from the U.S. Department of Transportation￿ s "Origin and Destination" survey. The
Origin and Destination survey is a 10 percent random sample of all ￿ ight coupons by domestic carriers in the
US. The version of the data used are the second quarter data from 2000 from the Data Bank 1A (DB1A). The
DB1A data contains a list of fares and the number of passengers traveling in each direction on a route. Route
information includes the origin and destination airports, the stops where passengers changed planes, and whether
the trip was one-way or round-trip. It also includes the great circle distance of each route. To supplement the
information from the above data sets I use 1999 MSA population estimates taken from the U.S. Census Bureau.
I consider a carrier to be o⁄ering nonstop service between two cities if they provide 52 or more nonstop ￿ ights
a quarter (approx 4 a week). To check the accuracy of the OAG data, I also require that I observe at least 500
passengers (50 passengers in the 10 percent sample) ￿ ying directly between the origin and destination cities in
the DB1A sample.
Using the DB1A data I chose the top 188 cities with the largest number of passenger enplanements in the
second quarter of 2000.
11 I then construct a data set that includes all nonstop travel between 188 cities in the
second quarter of 2000. I de￿ne a city as the MSA. Included in this sample are cities with multiple airports. For
example, I count entry in the Portland to Oakland market as entry in the Portland to San Francisco Area market.
There is clearly a trade-o⁄ between selecting a city pair as the relevant market rather than an airport pair. An
argument for using airport pair markets is that business travelers often have a strong preference for ￿ ying out
of major airports. This is the view taken in Ciliberto and Tamer (2006). However, by looking at the city pair
market my estimates capture an important aspect of competition between major network carriers and low-cost
carriers operating in secondary airports in the same city. For instance, Southwest operates out of Oakland in the
San Fransisco bay area and competes with United Airlines that operates out of the San Fransisco Airport. Both
Reiss and Spiller (1989) and Berry (1992) view airline markets as city pairs.
I de￿ne an airline as having a hub in a city if the features of the airline network in that city satisfy two selection
rules. First, using DB1A data, I select cities in which a single carrier transports more than 300,000 passengers
that make a single connection through the hub to one of the 188 selected cities mentioned above. The ￿rst rule
eliminates all but 20 possible hubs. The second rule requires that 30 or more nonstop routes are o⁄ered out of
the hub. Applying the second rule leaves 18 selected hubs. These 18 hubs account for 81.4 percent of all one-stop




To show that these selected hubs vary signi￿cantly from other airport operations, I contrast characteristics
of the selected hubs with the next 18 potential hubs with the highest number of stopping passengers. See table
8 for detailed list of the selected hubs and the next 18 potential hubs. Table 8 contains detailed information
about the operations at each hub and is sorted by the number of stopping passengers. The next 18 potential hubs
account for only 12.5 percent of all one-stop tra¢ c. The selected hubs di⁄er from the next 18 is in the percent of
the passengers using the hub that are changing planes. I compare the average percent of passengers that change
planes in the 18 selected hubs with the next 18 potential hubs. The average airport in one of the selected hubs
has 44.14 percent of passengers changing planes, while the average airport in the next 18 potential hubs has only
14.6 percent of passengers changing planes. The types of carriers operating in the next 18 potential hubs are also
distinct from those in the 18 selected hubs. Nine of the next 18 hubs are operated by Southwest, and four others
are operated by other low-cost carriers. The other carriers in the group of the next 18 include United Airlines
at San Francisco, Continental at New York , United Airlines at Los Angeles, and United Airlines at Washington
DC.
The next step in constructing the data is de￿ning one-stop service through a hub. The networks of large
airlines allow them to serve the same route in a number of di⁄erent ways. For purposes of this paper, I am
interested in the one-stop route that is the closest substitute with nonstop service. Therefore, I select the most
direct route passing through a major hub. By a "most direct" route, I mean the total distance of the trip is the
shortest. I use the nonstop entry information out of hubs and the location of the hubs to select the most direct
one-stop ￿ ight through the network. To illustrate this construction, consider Continental Airline￿ s Austin to New
York market. The data shows nonstop service from Continental￿ s hub in Houston to both Austin and New York.
Next, I examine whether this is the most direct one-stop ￿ ight that Continental o⁄ers. I ￿nd that although they
have a hub in Cleveland, the one-stop ￿ ight through Houston is a more direct route. Hence, I assume that the
relevant service is the one-stop service being o⁄ered is through Houston.
13
In de￿ning one-stop service I exclude very low quality one-stop services o⁄ered through hubs. I determine
criteria for what one-stop service may be considered "low-quality" by looking at the directness of one-stop ￿ ights
that passengers usually ￿ y as observed in the DB1A data. Typically, I did not observe one-stop passengers on
routes in which the distance is more than twice the distance as the crow ￿ ies between two cities. I do not consider
an airline as o⁄ering one-stop service if the distance along the two segments of the one-stop service is more than
twice the distance between the city pairs.
In selecting the subsample of city pair markets, I begin by following Berry (1992) by choosing all city pair
12I calculate this statistic as (total number of indirect passengers changing plans at the airport)/(tot passengers changing planes at the
airport+total passengers originating from the airport+total passengers destined for the airport)
13I checked this example on Expedia on March 3, 2005, and found that Continental o⁄ered both nonstop and one-stop service between
Austin and New York where the one-stop service is o⁄ered through Houston. In constructing the one-stop routes, I do not use information
on where passengers are observed traveling. The problem with using the observed routes taken by passengers is that it is endogenous
because it depends on the quality of the other services in the market and the pricing decision after entry.
8combinations between the 50 most populated cities. The most populated cities are used because these are also
cities that are more likely to have nonstop entry. An additional reason for using the 50 most populated cities
is that the assumption of hub networks being ￿xed is more plausible in larger markets where the number of
passengers in the network would diminish by a greater amount if the spoke route is exited. Recall that the
descriptive statistics regarding entry and exit at hubs were based on the 50 largest cities. Next, I eliminate city
pair markets based on two selection rules. First, markets in which any carrier operates a major hub are eliminated.
As argued before, because of the strong complementarities in hub markets, I treat nonstop entry out of hubs as
￿xed. Modeling this entry decision while treating it as ￿xed in other markets would be logically inconsistent.
The second type of market that is eliminated are city pair markets for which the distance between the cities is less
than 300 miles. These markets are eliminated because I want to focus on markets where nonstop and one-stop
services are likely to compete. In short distance routes the closest substitute to nonstop entry may be car travel
and not a one-stop ￿ ight. After applying these selection rules I am left with 511 city pair markets.
4.1 Variables
The variables used in this paper include market variables and airline speci￿c variables. The market variables
include both population and distance variables. The population variable is constructed from the 1999 U.S.
Census Data measured as the geometric mean of the population in the two cities in millions.
14 The distance
variable is the great circle distance between the two cities in hundreds of miles.
15
The airline speci￿c variables capture the network e⁄ects of an airline and the characteristics of the one-stop
services in the market. Although the larger hubs are removed from the sample, the network e⁄ects that are present
in the remaining cities are still important determinants of entry. For example, Southwest has no major hubs, but
it has a signi￿cant presence in a number of cities. To capture network e⁄ects I use the variable NetworkEffect
which is the number of markets entered nonstop out of the two endpoint cities to the 188 cities in the large sample,
but excluding the nonstop route on the city being considered. For example, consider the entry decision between
city A and city B. Consider calculating the network variable for airline X. Excluding the A to B entry decision,
if airline X has 4 nonstop routes out of city A and 5 nonstop routes out of B then the NetworkEffect variable
is 4 + 5 = 9.
The variable One ￿ stop is a dummy variable which is one if an airline o⁄ers a one-stop service through a
hub and is equal to zero otherwise. This variable captures the cannibalization of an airlines existing service. The
e⁄ect of this variable on the non-stop entry of an airline is expected to be negative. The variable OneOthStop
equals one if there is another airline in the market o⁄ering one-stop service. The variable NumOthStop equals
the number of additional rival airlines o⁄ering one-stop service in the market.
I measure quality of the one-stop service as the total distance ￿ own on the one-stop ￿ ight minus the distance
14In the A to B city pair market the population variable is Pop =
p
(PopulationinCityA=1million) ￿ (PopulationinCityB=1million).
A similar measure is used by Berry (1992)
15In the case where there are multiple airports in a city, I take the average distance between airports in the city.
9as the crow ￿ ies between two cities. For instance, the quality of the one-stop ￿ ight in the Austin to Portland
market with a stop in Houston may be calculated taking the following steps: calculate the distance from Austin to
Houston, add the distance from Houston to Portland, and then subtract the distance crow ￿ ying distance between
Portland and Austin. I call this variable CircDist.
16 A similar measure is used by Reiss and Spiller (1989)
and Borenstein (1989).
17 As this variable increases the quality of the one-stop service is lower. The variable
OwnCircDist is the CircDist variable of an airline￿ s own one-stop service in the market. If an airline does not
have a one-stop product in the market then OwnCircDist equals zero. The variable RivalCircDist is the quality
of the highest quality rival airline in the market. If no airline is in the market then RivalCircDist equals zero.
The model in this paper estimates a game of competition between entrants. I consider an airline as a potential
entrant in this model if the airline has some presence in both cities of the city pair market in the second quarter
of 2000.
18 This de￿nition may be justi￿ed if one views nonstop entry as actually occurring in two stages: ￿rst
airlines decide which cities they will enter, and second they decide which routes will be entered nonstop out of
the city. The game analyzed in this paper takes the ￿rst stage of entry in a city as given and then analyzes the
decision to enter nonstop in a particular city pair market. The reasons for using this de￿nition of entry is that it
focuses the entry game on the most likely set of entrants. This de￿nition of a potential entrant di⁄ers from that
used in Berry (1992) which de￿nes an airline as a potential entrant if they have some presence at either endpoint
city. I ￿nd that the de￿nition used by Berry includes many ￿rms as potential entrants that are not likely to enter
a market.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Before describing the full empirical model, I examine some descriptive tables that provide some insights into the
determinants of nonstop entry. Table 2 tabulates descriptive statistics by the number of airlines o⁄ering nonstop
service. The ￿rst column lists the number of nonstop entrants and the second column shows the frequency in
which that number of nonstop entrants are observed in the data. The frequencies show that in most of the
markets in the sample there is no airline o⁄ering nonstop service. The third through sixth columns show the
mean of the population variables, distance, number of one-stop services and the most direct one-stop service in
the market. I ￿nd that distance is typically greater in markets in which no carrier o⁄ers nonstop service. This
may re￿ ect the success of low-cost carriers in entering short distance nonstop routes. The table also shows that
nonstop services increase with population. In a markets with fewer nonstop services o⁄ered the highest quality
one-stop service is greater.
16It should also be noted that CircDist relates to the cost of providing one-stop service. The greater the CircDist variable, the creater
the cost of providing transportation services through a hub.
17One could argue that a more accurate measure of quality may be total time of a ￿ight or some on-time performance measure at a
hub. Although these measures may be a more accurate re￿ection of consumer preferences, it is not clear that these measure of quality
are exogenous to competition. Mazzeo (2003) ￿nds that the on-time performance of a carrier improves with increased competition in the
market suggesting that on-time performance may be chosen by carriers.
18By "presence" I mean that there is are some passengers observed ￿ying in or out of the city.
10Table 3 shows the number of markets entered by each airline and the average value of NetworkEffect for
each airline. There are two points to note in this table. First, Southwest enters more markets than any other
airline in the sample. This is not surprising given Southwest￿ s strategy of avoiding direct competition with major
hubs and their focus on entering markets with nonstop service. Second, there appears to be a strong association
between the network e⁄ect variable and the number of markets a carrier enters with nonstop service, suggesting
that this is likely to be an important explanatory variable. For instance, Southwest that has entered the greatest
number of markets in the sample, also has the highest average for the NetworkEffect variable.
Table 4 shows some basic statistics of the CircDist quality measure including the mean, standard deviaion,
minimum and maximum. These basic statistics provided in order of their quality ranking in the market, from
highest quality (least circuitus) to lowest quality (most circuitus). Note that the average circular distance of the
most direct one-stop ￿ ight in the market is about 25 miles. This distance re￿ ects the strategic placement of hubs
in central locations in the country, and centrally located hubs can o⁄er more direct service to more destinations.
This suggests that for most cities there is a major hub that o⁄ers fairly direct service. The average CircDist for
the second highest quality ￿rm is more than three times greater than the highest quality. The average circular
distance variable across all markets and all airlines is 2 (i.e. 200 additional miles are ￿ own).
5 Econometric Model of Entry
I model airlines as playing a complete information entry game. At the beginning of the game, each potential
entrant knows its own and its rivals￿ post-entry incremental pro￿ts. Incremental pro￿ts for o⁄ering nonstop
service depend on existing one-stop services in the market through a hub, network features in the city pair,
observed and unobserved demand and cost factors, and the number of rivals entering with nonstop service. Given
this information, airlines enter the market with nonstop service if their incremental pro￿ts are positive, otherwise
they do not. I will begin by describing an econometric entry model that is similar to the model presented in
Berry (1992).
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i ￿Market + x
Network
ik ￿Network + x
OneStop





ik capture the network e⁄ects of ￿rm k in market i. The variables xi are market speci￿c
variables capturing observed market speci￿c demand and cost factors. The variables x
OneStop
ik capture the in￿ uence
of airline k￿ s own one-stop service and the one-stop services of its rivals. I also allow for both market and ￿rm
speci￿c unobserved pro￿ts ￿i and ￿ik. The parameters to be estimated are ￿Market;￿Network;￿OneStop and ￿.
19The static results provide an estimate of the expected future pro￿tability of the airline for being in the market. This static expected
pro￿tability may be di⁄erent from the actual pro￿tability. For instance, in the observed sample a ￿rms pro￿ts may actually be negative,
but the airline expects future pro￿tability may be positive.
11The variable Ni is the number of airlines that enter in the city pair market, which is the dependent variable in
the above model. I assume that additional entry causes pro￿t loss to other airlines in the market so ￿ ￿ 0.
The number of airlines that enter in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium equals the maximum number of airlines








where Ki is the number of potential entrants in market i. The number of airlines that enter in equilibrium is
unique. To see this, suppose it is not unique, then there is an equilibrium number of airlines Ni 6= N
￿
i . If Ni > N
￿
i
this implies that some airline must be making negative pro￿ts, and if Ni < N
￿
i then there exists a airline that
could pro￿tably enter the market but chooses not to enter.
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The identity of entering airlines in an equilibrium of the above game is not unique. Consider the simple
example of a market with two potential entrants that each ￿nd it pro￿table to enter as a monopolist, ￿
￿
ik(1) > 0,
but do not ￿nd it pro￿table to enter in a duopoly market ￿
￿
ik(2) < 0. The above model implies that N
￿
i = 1,
but it is unclear which of the two airlines enters. To use information on the identity of airlines I follow Berry
(1992) by assuming that airlines enter in the order of post entry pro￿tability. This assumption can be justi￿ed
by airlines playing a post-entry war of attrition that would instantly eliminate less pro￿table airlines if more than
N
￿
i enter as in Judd (1985). Under the "most-pro￿table ￿rm enters ￿rst" selection rule, let I
￿
ik be an indicator of
entry by airline k in market i. The function I
￿
ik is 1 if ￿rm k in market i is one of the N
￿
i most pro￿table airlines
in the market, and 0 otherwise.
The above model does not allow for nonstop rivals to a⁄ect one-stop pro￿ts. It may be the case that a nonstop
rival may reduce pro￿ts on one-stop service, which may induce nonstop entry by a carrier o⁄ering one-stop service.
The following is an alternative reduced-form pro￿t function that allows nonstop competition to have a di⁄erent





i ￿Market + x
Network
ik ￿Network + x
OneStop
ik ￿OS ￿ ￿(Ni) + ￿(Ni)x
OneStop
ik + ￿￿i +
p
1 ￿ ￿2￿ik
The incremental pro￿t function above di⁄ers from the other model because it includes the parameter ￿ that
accounts for the impact of a nonstop competitor on one-stop pro￿ts for carriers o⁄ering one-stop service. Theory
would suggest that ￿ should be positive because additional competition in the nonstop market will erode pro￿ts
in the one-stop market, reducing cannibalization e⁄ects, and making it hub carriers less responsive to the entry
of nonstop rivals.
The inclusion of the additional coe¢ cient, ￿, complicates the model because it introduces the possibility of
multiple equilibria. The multiple equilibria may arise because the impact of rival entry on pro￿tability di⁄ers
for one-stop and nonstop competitors. For instance, suppose that in the above equation the value of ￿ is greater
than ￿ and both ￿ and ￿ are positive. Then for a market with two hub ￿rms there could be two equilibria, one
where they both enter and another where neither enters. To address the potential problem of multiple equilibria,
I select a unique equilibrium to estimate the above model. Speci￿cally, I choose the Nash equilibrium with the
20This follows directly from Berry (1992)
12greatest number of ￿rms entering the market, so the equilibrium selection rule remains identical to (2) above.
This selection rule is again consistent with the war of attrition game where the most pro￿table ￿rms remain in
the market.
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5.1 Method of Simulated Moments Estimator
The econometric model above is estimated using a Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimator (McFadden
(1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989)).
22 I employ a frequency simulator in my analysis. I start by taking R
simulation draws. For a given set of parameter values b and simulation draw r 2 (1:::R) I evaluate the pro￿t
function for all potential airlines in the market and I solve for the Nash equilibrium number of ￿rms in each
market Nir(b). I also use the ordering assumption to determine the identities of the Nir(b) ￿rms in the market,
where the entry prediction for market i for airline k and simulation draw r is Iikr(b).
An unbiased estimator of the number of airlines that enter market i is found by averaging over the predictions





To obtain an unbiased estimator of the entry of individual airlines, I average over the individual entry predictions





Let the observed number of airlines entering in market i be N
￿
i , and let the observed entry decision of airline
k in market i be I
￿
ik. I specify the prediction error in the number of airlines for market i as ui(b) = N
￿
i ￿ ^ Ni(b). I
specify the prediction error in the identity of airline k in market i as uik(b) = I
￿
I ￿ ^ Ii(b). The number of potential
entrants varies in each market. For this reason, I choose the two potential entrants in the market with the highest
network e⁄ect variable. The vector of prediction errors is then vi(b) = ui;ui1;ui2.
From these predictions errors I construct moments. Let f(Zi;Zi1;Zi2) be an L dimensional function of the















The value g(b) is a vector of size L and the true b satis￿es E[g(b)] = 0. The MSM-estimator ^ b is de￿ned as the





where the ￿ is a weight matrix. I estimate this model in two stages. In the ￿rst stage I set ￿ equal to the
identity matrix to get a consistent estimate of b. In the second stage I calculate the optimal weight matrix
￿ = E (g(b) g
0(b)) by using estimates of b from the ￿rst stage. Finally, I solve the above equation again using
the new weight matrix to obtain my ￿nal estimates. I use simulated annealing to solve for the minimum of the
objective function.
21The approach of selecting a unique equilibrium to estimate a structural entry model is also applied in Mazzeo (2002).
22This section closely follows Berry (1992).
13I employ di⁄erent instruments depending on the speci￿cation of the model. The instruments used are discussed
along with the each speci￿cation in the next section. The standard errors are computed using the formula in Pakes
and Pollard (1989) where the asymptotic distribution of
p














Before estimating the full model, it may be useful to analyze a simpler probit model that excludes competition
from the analysis. Although the probit model ignores competition between nonstop rivals, it provides a basic
approach to look at the impact of one-stop services on nonstop entry. If competition with other nonstop entrants
is not an important determinant of entry, then a simple probit model will accurately capture an airlines decision
to enter a market. Table 5 shows two simple probit estimates of entry for all potential entrants in each market.
Model 1 only includes an airline￿ s own one-stop service, while model 2 includes features of both an airline￿ s own
one-stop service and the service of its rivals. Focusing on model 2, the probit estimate shows that ownership of
a one-stop service reduces the probability of entry. This re￿ ects cannibalization of an airline￿ s own service. An
increase in the circular distance of an airline￿ s own one stop service increases the probability of entry. A reason
for this is that cannibalization e⁄ects are reduced as the quality of one￿ s own service are lower. Recall that the
CircDist variable captures the additional distance ￿ own on a route and proxies for the time cost for the customer.
As an alternative, one could use the additional distance ￿ own relative to the total direct distance by dividing
the CircDist variable by the distance between the origin and destination cities and proxies for the relative time
costs. I ￿nd that the results of the simple probit model estimated below do not qualitatively change if I use
either quality measure. If there is a one-stop rival in the market then the probability of entry declines which is
consistent with business stealing e⁄ects. An increase in the circular distance of a rival airline￿ s service increases
the probability of entry suggesting that business stealing e⁄ects are less for lower quality rival services. For each
additional one-stop entrant the probability of entering increases. This last result is not consistent with the view
that competition is greater as the number of one-stop entrants increases. Although the probit captures many of
the e⁄ects of interest, it is di¢ cult to know how important nonstop competition is between carriers until looking
at estimates from the full model.
Now I look at four speci￿cations of the structural model that incorporates competition with other nonstop
entrants. These estimates are shown in table 6. The ￿rst model is a benchmark model that excludes information
on one-stop service in the market. The model is similar to that in Berry (1992), but applied to nonstop entry.
In this benchmark model there are 19 moment conditions.
23 Most of the results of the benchmark model follow
23The instruments Zi for the market speci￿c error term ui include the exogenous covariates of population and distance. It also includes
a count of the number of potential entrants, the number of ￿rms with the network e⁄ect variable greater than 5, the number of ￿rms
with the network variable greater than 10, and the sum of the squared share of nonstop services o⁄ered out of the city. The instruments
for the ￿rm speci￿c error terms ui1, and ui2 include all the covariates for the individual ￿rm. In addition, I also use the number of ￿rms
in the market with network variable greater than 10 and the number of potential entrants as additional instruments in the individual
14expectations. The larger the population in the cities the more likely airlines are to enter because of the greater
demand in the market. The longer the distance the lower the demand and the higher the cost for o⁄ering nonstop
service. The greater the network e⁄ect the more likely airlines are to enter. There are two results that are
surprising in these estimates. First, the coe¢ cient on the number of rival nonstop entrants in the market is
statistically insigni￿cant. This is unexpected given that the structural studies by Berry (1992) and Ciliberto and
Tamer (2006) that ￿nd competition has a statistical signi￿cant e⁄ect on the entry of other carriers. The second
surprising result is that the market speci￿c unobservable is insigni￿cant. Since there are many market speci￿c
demand factors that are unobserved one might have expected this term to be positive and signi￿cant. Examples
of route speci￿c unobservables include number of business travelers, vacation tra¢ c, or any other unobserved
factor a⁄ecting the amount of travel between two cities. It is possible that these market speci￿c unobservable
pro￿ts are not present, but it may also be the case that we have not isolated the ￿rm speci￿c heterogeneity.
The second speci￿cation adds to the benchmark model by incorporating each airlines￿own one-stop entry and
the circular distance of the service. In estimating this model I include 8 additional moment restrictions to identify
the additional parameters.
24 These estimates show that an airline having one-stop service of high quality reduces
their pro￿ts from o⁄ering nonstop service. The estimates also show that as the circular distance of an airline￿ s
own one-stop service increases, incremental pro￿ts from entering also increase. Both of these results are consistent
with airlines reacting to cannibalization e⁄ects. The result contrasts with the benchmark model because it shows
that competition with other nonstop services has a signi￿cant and negative e⁄ect on pro￿ts. These estimates
imply that capturing the heterogeneity of airline service ownership in the market may be important for accurately
capturing nonstop competition between airlines. In other words, it seems that the benchmark model may su⁄er
from omitted variable bias. The magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients imply that owning a high quality one
stop product with an OwnCircDistik variable near zero is similar in magnitude to having an additional nonstop
rival in the market. This suggests that the magnitude of the cannibalization e⁄ects are large in relative terms.
The last three estimates are full models that include both an airline￿ s own one-stop service and the one-
stop service of rival airlines. The results of full model 1 are similar to the results of the second probit model.
The results are consistent with one￿ s own product having cannibalization e⁄ects and rival one-stop and nonstop
products having business stealing e⁄ects. The business stealing e⁄ects from rival one-stop entrants are slightly
di⁄erent than those of the probit model. In particular, the coe¢ cient on the number of one-stop entrants variable
NumOthOne ￿ Stop was signi￿cant in the probit model, but is insigni￿cant in these full-model speci￿cations.
The insigni￿cance of the NumOthOne ￿ Stop variable in the full models suggests that only the ￿rst one-stop
competitor has an a⁄ect on the pro￿ts of nonstop rivals and that subsequent one-stop entrants do not have a
signi￿cant impact on nonstop entry.
The columns showing results from full model 2 and full model 3 include the vector of coe¢ cients ￿ from
￿rms error.
24The additional market speci￿c instruments include a dummy of whether there is at least one one-stop service in the market, the total
number of one-stop services, and the circular distances of the two most direct one-stop services in the market. Airline speci￿c moment
restrictions include the two additional instruments for each error term.
15speci￿cation (3) above. Full models 2 and 3 di⁄er from full model 1 by allowing for nonstop competitors to have
a di⁄erent impact on hub carriers o⁄ering one-stop service and those not o⁄ering one-stop service. Many of the
results are similar to the results found in the models discussed above, so I will focus on the key di⁄erences. Full
model 2 includes an interation between the number of nonstop rivals and carriers o⁄ering one-stop service, and
we ￿nd that this coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signi￿cant as we had predicted. The result suggests that
the hub carriers are less responsive to nonstop entry relative to other carriers. In fact, it appears hub carriers
actually have a positive response to rival entry. One interpretation of this result is that hub carriers are matching
quality of rivals by entering the market with nonstop service as the pro￿tability of their one-stop service declines.
Full model 3 extends the speci￿cation of full model 2 by including an interaction of the number of nonstop rivals
with the OwnCircDistik variable. In this speci￿cation, the OwnCircDistik variable is now insigni￿cant and
so is the coe¢ cient on the interaction between the One ￿ stop variable and the number of nonstop rivals, but
the interaction between the number of nonstop rivals and OwnCircDistik is positive and statistically signi￿cant.
The results from full model 3 suggest that the e⁄ect of an additional nonstop rival on the entry of a hub carrier
will largely be determined by the quality of the hub carriers product. In particular, the results suggest that the
higher quality ￿rms will be less likely to enter with nonstop service relative to low quality ￿rms that are more
likely to react by matching the quality of rivals in the market. Since the average value of the OwnCircDistik
variable is 2, the results imply that nonstop entry will have little impact on carriers o⁄ering an average quality
one-stop service because the additional competition from a nonstop competitor is o⁄set by an incentive to match
quality.
For both the full model 2 and full model 3 results, the market speci￿c error term ￿ is positive and statistically
signi￿cant, while it is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in other speci￿cations. Finding that ￿ is positive and
statistically signi￿cant in these speci￿cation suggests that this model may capture some important ￿rm-speci￿c
heterogeneity that helps isolate the market speci￿c unobservable.
The models estimated above include a linear competitive e⁄ect of ￿ (N) rather than a term that assumes a
decline in competition with additional entrants, such as ￿ log(N). The linear functional form assumption was
used because this paper is unlike traditional entry models because the model incorporates product ownership.
A priori, it wasn￿ t clear how this might a⁄ect the estimates, so a linear functional form was chosen. However,
estimating full model 3 with the functional form ￿ log(N), I ￿nd that the model is robust to this alternative
speci￿cation.
6.1 Predictions and Analysis
This section compares the predictions made by the models estimated in this paper. I compare the full models to
the second probit model to evaluate the importance of structurally modeling competition. I also compare the full
model 1 and full model 3 to the baseline structural model to check the importance of incorporating information
on one-stop service. The results suggest that full model 3 provides the best prediction of the number of entrants,
but that the probit produces the most accurate prediction on the identities of entering carriers. However, the
16full models appear to provide more reasonable out-of-sample predictions
Table 7 shows the prediction for each of the four models. The ￿rst row of table 7 shows the estimated number
of airlines predicted to enter, the next set of rows shows the measurements of the in-sample predictive accuracy
of each model. The predictive accuracy of each model is measured using the mean squared error to predict the
number of airlines that enter. The table shows that full model 3 performs the best, followed by the probit. The
simple probit model seems to perform better than the other two models in predicting individual ￿rm entry. A
potential reason for the predictive accuracy of the probit model is that in many markets it is unlikely that multiple
nonstop carriers will compete, so the probit model is likely to perform. In addition, the "full model" only uses
information on the two airlines with the greatest market presence, while the probit uses all individual airline
entry decisions, so it is not surprising that the probit performs better for predicting individual entry. However,
in-sample predictive accuracy is not the only criterion that should be used in determining the usefulness of a
model. Reasonable out-of-sample predictions should also be considered. In table 7 I look at 5 di⁄erent types of
changes to exogenous variables and how these changes a⁄ect the predicted number of entrants.
In experiment 1, I look at a change in the population variable. The probit model results in a much smaller
increase in the total number of entering ￿rms relative to all of the structural models. An increase in the network
variable of each potential entrant by 10, more than doubles the number of predicted entrants in the probit model
to 824:8, but increases the full model (1) and (3) to less than 700. The reason for the high number of ￿rms
predicted in the probit model is that it does not account for the increased competition in the market as more
airlines enter.
Next I examine the e⁄ect of changing circular distance in the market. In experiment 4 I hold constant the rival
services, and I increase each airlines own circular distance by 200 miles. In both the probit and the full model
1 there is only a slight increase in the number of entering ￿rms. In full model 3, the e⁄ect is more dramatic
because as the quality of the airline￿ s one-stop service falls, the ability to remain competitive with nonstop rivals
is diminished, so there is additional incentive to enter the market. It should be noted that the prediction of full
model 3 is quite di⁄erent from that of full model 1. Full model 1 suggests that the incentive to enter increases as
the OwnCircDist increases in ALL markets, while the results in full model 3 reject this broad e⁄ect and suggest
that the incentives are isolated to markets facing nonstop competition.
In experiment 5, I hold constant each ￿rms own circular distance and increase the rival circular distance by
200 miles. This increases the number of predicted ￿rms entering to 434:1 in full model 1 and 462:7 in full model
3, while the probit model predicts 558:2 airlines entering. Again, the reason for the di⁄erence in predictions is
that the probit model does not account for competition in the market.
In the ￿nal experiment I evaluate the total e⁄ect of cannibalization from one-stop services by holding constant
the rival services in the market and examine the e⁄ect on entry if no ￿rm owned a one-stop service (i.e. assuming
that the coe¢ cient on One￿Stop=0 and the coe¢ cient on OwnCircDist=0). With the full model I ￿nd evidence
that when cannibalization e⁄ects are removed the average number of nonstop services in the market increases to
417:2.
While the in-sample ￿t varies considerably across the models, the results from this section suggest that the
17probit estimates may be less reliable for making out-of-sample forecasts, and models that explicitly account for
competition in the marketplace appear to produce more reasonable predictions.
7 Conclusion
Empirical studies of entry have largely ignored the role of product ownership in shaping new product entry
decisions. This paper explicitly looks at the role of product ownership and its a⁄ect on nonstop entry in the
airline industry. The results from this paper con￿rm many prior expectations. I ￿nd evidence that cannibalization
of an airline￿ s own one-stop service reduce the probability that an airline enters a market. As the quality of an
airline￿ s own one-stop service falls, this cannibalization e⁄ect diminishes. Competition with rival one-stop services
is also an important determinant of nonstop entry. The presence of a rival o⁄ering one-stop service in the market
reduces the probability of entry, which is consistent with competition between one-stop and nonstop service types.
In addition, I ￿nd that higher quality one-stop products reduce the probability of nonstop entry by a greater
amount than lower quality one-stop products.
I ￿nd that competition between nonstop entrants is also an important determinant of nonstop entry. The
results suggest that incremental pro￿ts tend to decline as the number of nonstop rivals in the market increase. I
also ￿nd that the e⁄ect of an additional nonstop carrier in the market reduces the probability of nonstop entry
by more for carriers not o⁄ering one-stop service in the market relative to those that o⁄er one-stop service. This
is consistent with hub carriers pro￿ts being impacted by multiple factors. Speci￿cally, an additional nonstop
competitor tends to reduce pro￿ts for all airlines in the market, but there is also an incentive for the hub carrier
to match quality of nonstop rivals as pro￿ts on its one-stop service diminish with the entry of nonstop rivals. I
￿nd that the incentive to match quality is greatest for one-stop carriers o⁄ering lower quality one-stop service.
More generally, the results in this paper provide some insight into what we might expect to ￿nd in other
vertically di⁄erentiated product markets with multiproduct ￿rms. The decision to enter a market with a high-
quality product depends on whether the ￿rm or one of its rivals already o⁄ers low-quality service in the market.
Cannibalization e⁄ects may shape the entry decision of ￿rms because owning a low quality product makes it less
likely that a ￿rm will enter a market with a high-quality product. However, if a high-quality rival enters the
market this reduces the cannibalization e⁄ects from entry.
The results in this paper may also be useful for policymakers. The DOT mentioned several instances where
low cost carriers have complained about major hub carriers entering markets with nonstop service, even though
hub carriers o⁄er one-stop service through a hub. The results from this paper suggest that this type of response
is not unusual, especially in markets where the hub carrier￿ s one-stop service is particularly low.
An important extension of this model may be to structurally identify marginal cost, ￿xed cost and demand
factors a⁄ecting entry decisions. These components of a ￿rms pro￿t function may be identi￿ed using additional
information on prices and passenger travel.
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Non-hub markets 293 144 49.15% 57 19.45%
Hub Carriers at their hub 601 36 5.99% 8 1.33%
Notes:
Sample includes all city pair combinations between the largest 50 U.S. cities with distances over 300 miles
Excludes airlines that stopped operating over this time period
Tot. Nonstop in 2000 in Non-hub markets:  380
Tot. Nonstop in 2000 by hub carrier at their hub:  629
Table 2: Summary Statistics










0 319 13.78 1.71 5.69 17.97
1 92 11.02 2.27 5.82 32.18
2 52 11.40 3.16 5.62 35.19
3 29 11.43 3.84 5.66 41.48
4 8 8.95 4.64 3.38 130.43
5 7 13.38 8.37 4.71 17.40
6 1 10.35 4.60 7.00 10.00
8 3 10.17 7.00 7.00 8.33










American Airlines 45 511 11.22
Continental 23 511 8.09
Delta 44 511 13.79
Northwest 0 511 4.66
United Airlines 37 511 9.83
TWA 9 426 3.60
US Airways 44 359 16.12
Southwest 95 301 23.34
America West 20 213 6.85
Midwest Express Airline 20 170 5.75
Midway Airlines Inc. 14 109 3.66
Alaska 11 70 6.01
Sun Country Airlines 3 70 1.47
American Trans Air 5 69 3.03
Frontier Airlines 0 49 1.63
Airtran 0 43 2.84
National Airlines 3 9 1.67
Spirit Air Lines 4 9 3.44
Pro Air Services 0 9 2.00
Jet Blue 3 6 0.67
Legend 0 2 0.00
Vanguard 0 1 6.00
21Table 4: One-Stop Circular Distance (in Miles)
Quality
Rank High
to Low Mean Median s.d. Min Max
1st 24.96 6 59.91 0 610
2nd 85.48 43.00 107.00 0 582
3rd 145.14 80.00 157.37 0 932
4th 203.09 161.50 172.67 1 775
5th 297.44 252.00 226.96 4 1047
22Table 5: Probit Estimates*
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Constant -2.163 -1.709
(24.25) (10.52)






Own Circ Dist (100s miles) 0.050 0.054
(2.23) (2.38)
Rival Circ Dist (100s miles) 0.236
(5.03)
Rival  One-Stop -1.274
(5.43)
Num Oth One-Stop 0.156
(4.69)
Network Effects 0.088 0.088
(26.02) (25.52)
log likelihood -667.486 -648.233
* Asy-Z statistics in parenthasis
23Table 6: Main Results*







Constant -2.483 -2.281 -1.625 -1.193 -1.425
(30.80) (24.57) (5.78) (4.99) (3.12)
distance (100's miles) -0.104 -0.114 -0.128 -0.069 -0.090
(6.80) (7.66) (7.42) (5.47) (6.02)
Population 0.261 0.408 0.415 0.196 0.268
(3.41) (3.78) (3.88) (4.50) (4.00)
One-stop -0.694 -0.647 -1.431 -0.786
(4.06) (4.58) (7.25) (3.65)
Own Circ Dist (100s miles) 0.090 0.080 0.069 -0.074
(2.13) (1.93) (1.16) (0.82)
Rival Circ Dist (100s miles) 0.178 0.216 0.252
(2.72) (3.58) (4.91)
Rival  One-Stop -0.829 -1.569 -1.625
(2.49) (5.69) (4.14)
Num Oth One-Stop 0.070 -0.065 0.076
(1.55) (1.28) (1.41)
Network Effects 0.107 0.102 0.103 0.131 0.121
(18.15) (15.20) (16.71) (13.92) (14.57)
Number nonstop rivals (delta) -0.195 -0.437 -0.522 -0.464 -0.411
(1.33) (3.23) (3.27) (16.50) (2.53)
# Nonstop Rivals * One-stop  (alpha_1) 0.898 -0.036
(24.40) (0.21)
# Nonstop Rivals * Own Circ Dist  (alpha_2) 0.173
(4.09)
Market Correlation 0.077 0.050 0.010 0.695 0.645
(.34) (0.18) (0.12) (2.21) (1.61)
# Observations 511 511 511 511 511
Moments 19 27 34 34 34
Simulation Draws 12 12 12 12 12
OBJ Function 62.76 70.19 64.61 70.51 69.55
24Table 7: Predictions and Analysis









Predicted # of Entrants:
371.7 355.9 358.0 355.3
Mean Squared Error:
# of Firms Prediction 0.416 0.502 0.486 0.393
Individual Firm Prediction 0.0432 0.0452 0.0441 0.0465
Entry Impact Analysis:
1.  Change in Pop. (Pop+1) 407.9 427.2 453.0 412.8
2.  Change in Network +10 824.8 741.4 632.6 684.7
3.  200m Increase  in Own Circ Dist 389.9 374.6 416.8
4.  200m Increase in Rival Circ Dist 558.2 434.1 462.7
5.  No firm owns one-stop product 492.5 417.2 392.0












Delta Atlanta 104 4,015,240 3,986,290 49.8%
American Airlines Dallas 92 2,604,720 2,007,650 43.5%
TWA St.Louis 71 1,245,540 1,867,920 60.0%
US Airways Charlotte 66 881,050 1,597,110 64.4%
Delta Cincinnati 92 871,010 1,594,810 64.7%
United Airlines Chicago 79 2,802,650 1,333,870 32.2%
United Airlines Denver 62 1,882,570 1,327,200 41.3%
Continental Houston 84 1,622,740 1,255,920 43.6%
US Airways Pitsburgh 71 1,025,440 1,179,500 53.5%
Northwest Airlines Detroit 80 2,040,140 1,147,380 36.0%
America West Phoenix 42 1,263,610 1,092,680 46.4%
Northwest Airlines Minneapolis 76 1,952,670 1,078,920 35.6%
American Airlines Chicago 73 2,009,650 923,320 31.5%
US Airways Philadelphia 62 1,560,850 648,910 29.4%
Delta Dallas 45 838,950 571,820 40.5%
Delta Salt Lake City 37 970,060 563,320 36.7%
Northwest Airlines Memphis 46 406,510 555,560 57.7%
Continental Cleveland 65 891,190 340,240 27.6%
Next 18
Airtran Atlanta 26 964,690 363,900 27.4%
Southwest Phoenix 30 1,566,270 308,430 16.5%
US Airways Washington DC 46 2,531,650 243,870 8.8%
Southwest Houston 22 1,234,640 229,580 15.7%
United Airlines San Fransisco 28 2,745,580 225,570 7.6%
Continental New York 61 2,613,140 222,670 7.9%
United Airlines Los Angeles 26 2,386,720 220,030 8.4%
Midway Airlines Raleigh 20 365,320 197,270 35.1%
United Airlines Washington DC 25 1,322,200 194,380 12.8%
Southwest Las Vegas 35 1,987,470 179,770 8.3%
Southwest Nashville 26 675,240 173,760 20.5%
Southwest Washington DC 24 1,195,510 166,900 12.3%
Southwest Dallas 12 1,240,750 166,070 11.8%
Southwest Chicago 25 1,230,330 162,730 11.7%
America West Las Vegas 31 968,950 148,750 13.3%
American Trans Air Chicago 21 790,170 120,370 13.2%
Southwest Kansas City 22 586,770 116,470 16.6%
Southwest St. Louis 21 607,650 113,480 15.7%
26